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The widespread use and abuse of the term "culture" both in current academic and popular discourse have come to shape the contemporary understanding of ourselves and the world around us like few other concepts. Nietzsche's philosophy contributed significantly to the modern popularity of this concept. His critique of modernity for its apparent lack of culture received great attention in the twentieth century. His writings had a big part in ringing in the "golden twenties" of cultural philosophy 1 and the not-so-golden thirties and forties of mono-cultural politics and propaganda. Despite the abuses of Nietzsche's philosophy by the Nazi propaganda machine, Nietzsche's critique of modernity was quickly rediscovered in the subsequent decades when it was reassessed against the background of the Nazi era. Two positions emerged, one arguing that Nietzsche's critique of Enlightenment values undermined these values and thus had played into the hands of totalitarian ideology and its desire to create its own "culture;" the other camp saw in Nietzsche a prophet of sorts whose philosophy had predicted the failure of the Enlightenment ideology to provide the West with a sustainable, unified and unifying culture.
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Although this particular debate is still played out today as part of the modernity / post-modernity discussion, the concept of culture took a seemingly different turn in the eighties and nineties.
Increased interest in multiculturalism initially shifted the attention away from a critical examination of Western culture and led to a focus on foreign, "primitive," suppressed, or otherwise marginalized cultures. Subsequently, the critique of Western culture was somewhat restricted to the political and moral realm. Proponents of multiculturalism turned to Western culture primarily to investigate its colonialist tendencies, the political and cultural mechanisms that allow it to suppress different cultures and cultural differences. Despite its focus on different cultures and colonialism, cultural studies eventually provoked a return to a more comprehensive interrogation of Western culture when its interest in culture itself began to be viewed as a cultural phenomenon. As multiculturalism came to be considered a cultural phenomenon of the West, 3 so too did the question of what Western culture might be lacking since it tends to observe and propagate other cultures within and outside of itself. After all, few other societies show much interest in the study and defense of different cultures or of cultural differences. Indeed, thinkers as diverse as Richard Rorty and Terry Eagleton --who rarely see eye to eye --seem to agree that our Western society's interest in different cultures is a unique feature of this society, a mark of difference, of an "otherness," and of self-alienation which signals at the very least a "loss of innocence" when it comes to Western society's own cultural identity. 4 My rather general overview of an undoubtedly more complex and multifaceted history of "culture" in the twentieth century is meant to suggest a return to the question of the cultural identity of the West -the question central to Nietzsche's critique of modernity. Before relating
Nietzsche's critique of modern culture to our contemporary, multi-media culture and its declared interest in multiculturalism it must be noted, however, that such an endeavor is not without complications: it runs the risk of ignoring the multiplicity of conflicting meanings that today are encompassed by the single term "culture" as well as the historical distance and national distinctiveness which separate the Anglo-American concept of culture from the German meaning of Kultur, a concept that, unlike its English counterpart, for centuries supported the German quest for a national identity. 5 The problem is compounded by the fact that today, the pan-national use of the Anglo-American concept also informs the German debates on Multikulturalität.
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Without denying the distinctiveness of the debates on culture then and now, Nietzsche's critique of modern culture can, nevertheless, be related to our contemporary concerns. For that purpose, however, we need to follow Rorty's and Eagleton's lead and understand the modern interest in culture --and subsequently the multiplicity of congruent and incongruent meanings of culture --as a cultural phenomenon, as a defining aspect of modernity's own culture. 7 As indicated, this is in tune with Nietzsche who understood his time's interest in (historical) culture(s) itself as a cultural phenomenon. This approach assumes a particular definition of culture, a definition of culture that is no longer restricted to what Nietzsche called "decorative" aspects of culture, particular customs, habits, or styles. Nietzsche understood culture more comprehensively. He interpreted customs, habits, and styles, but also concepts, signs, symbols, images, metaphors, and narratives as fashioning the beliefs, values, hierarchies, perceptions, and self-perceptions of a social unit. Accordingly, the modern concept of "culture" designates an observational mode, a perspective rather than particular physical differences. 8 Defined as an observational mode, modern culture is able to describe any event, artifact, or concept --including the concept of culture --as a cultural phenomenon.
I
Nietzsche's critique of modernity can be summarized in precisely in the following terms:
Culture has become a matter of perspective, a way of knowing rather than a way of practicing culture, and thus has lost its force. Subsequently, he interprets the modern interest in culture not as indicative of a new cultural paradigm, but rather as a sign of the absence of culture in modern society. Nietzsche unfolds his critique of Western society for its lack of culture most forcefully in the second Untimely Meditation, "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life."
The treatise was written in 1873, less than two years after Germany became a modern unified nation-state and at a time when the Western imperial powers were subjecting the rest of the world to their political will (with Germany soon asking for its "Platz an der Sonne"). In this time of national pride and expansionist ambition, when history was used, to speak in Nietzsche's terms, "monumentally" to inspire hopes of new grandeur, in an "antiquarian" fashion, to instill a sense of identity and belonging, and "critically" to reject old paradigms and make room for the new, Nietzsche takes a deliberately untimely stance. He sets out to understand "as a defect, infirmity and shortcoming of the age something of which our age is justifiably proud, its historical education" (History 8). 9 Historical education ("historische Bildung"), he argues, prevents rather than accomplishes Bildung. In the tradition of Alexander von Humboldt, Bildung strives for education to exceed the mere accumulation of knowledge or the mediation of particular skills. Bildung endeavors to fashion (literarily, to form after an image) a cultured (kultiviert), that is a mature, autonomous, responsible, civilized, and "whole" human being.
Nietzsche argues that not only does historical education fail to achieve Bildung in this comprehensive sense, but singles it out as the primary reason why modern society lacks culture altogether.
Nineteenth-century historical education included, of course, the study of ancient and foreign cultures. History is the (fateful) discipline that educates young men about culture in general:
[ Nietzsche interprets this social masquerade as the central symptom of a society that lacks culture.
In subsequent passages it is evident that Nietzsche is not targeting the dissimulation practices that evolved at the centralized European courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Rather, his argument against conventions and masquerades is directed at the German Enlightenment period. It was the fear of "conventions" that led the Germans to leave the school of the French for "he wanted to become more natural and thereby more German" (History 25).
Nietzsche mocks the German attempt to cast in nationalistic and cultural terms the propagation of bourgeois values such as rationality, sensibility, and inwardness in contrast to aristocratic French culture, which Germans were typecasting as shallow and fundamentally corrupt. The result of this endeavor, according to Nietzsche, was not the creation of a German cultural identity, but rather the disintegration of their cultural identity through the separation of "inside"
and "outside" -through the separation of their private from their social identity. contend, come to a better understanding of Nietzsche's cultural critique, as well as approach some of its inherent limitations. The structural change from stratification to functional differentiation is relevant in at least two regards, namely as it promotes social reflexivity and as it affects changes in the semantics of individuality. Functional differentiation leads modern society to develop a high degree of reflexivity within all of its subsystems. 16 Reflexivity is, of course, an important mark of Nietzsche's writing, but also the target of much of his criticism.
Nietzsche's critique of the modern educational system and of our knowledge-based-society in general rests on the conviction that science (Wissenschaft) should not serve the interests of science (a mark of functional differentiation, I would argue) but rather the interests of what Nietzsche somewhat cryptically calls "life." Below I will return to Nietzsche's stance on reflexivity, which leads him to assume the absence of culture in modern society in the first place.
Allow me to first address the second, and more immediate concern Nietzsche expresses, namely the disintegration of modern culture as it affects the individual. From the socio-historical point of view that I want to adopt here, the perceived disintegration can be understood in terms of the changes in the semantics of individuality that accompany the transition from pre-modern to modern society. The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann argues, pre-modern (stratified) societies defined the individual through social inclusion (through rank, blood, or profession) while modern, functionally differentiated societies define the individual through exclusion. In modern societies, the individual can no longer identify him-or herself with any single social subsystem. 17 Each person is identified and identifies him-or herself differently according to the social domains within which s/he is situated at the moment. Thus, s/he is seen and experiences him-or herself differently economically, legally, politically, when with family, watching TV, or when reading a systems theoretical interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. This lack of any coherent social recognition leads the individual to perceive him-or herself as being "complete"
and "authentic" only in areas which are perceived to be outside of the social sphere (for example, when alone, as artist, when reading literature, traveling, or maybe even through one's romantic involvement). 18 Lamenting the lack of culture in modern society in terms of modern man having created an interior without an exterior equivalent, and of modern man constantly hiding behind masks, Nietzsche appears to register the societal changes that resulted from the functional differentiation of society and the subsequent exclusion of the "whole" individual from the social sphere.
II
Before returning to the socio-historical contextualization of Nietzsche's critique of modern culture and exploring its limits (section IV), I want to address the medial dimension of his critique, the question how education (II) and why in particular historical education (III) should lead to the social disintegration of the modern individual. Nietzsche's argument is stunningly modern and relevant for contemporary concerns for he might well be the first thinker who understands modern times as an information age. Nietzsche relates the proclaimed loss of culture to modern society's information processing media, which include the education system and the mass media of his time, the printing press. Both participate in what Nietzsche calls the educational procedure, how history is taught that it produces "not at all the liberally educated man but the scholar [...], the precocious newly wise chatter box" (History 59 In the end, modern man drags an immense amount of indigestible knowledge stones around with him which on occasion rattle around in his belly as the fairy tale has it. This rattling betrays the most distinctive property of this modern man:
the remarkable opposition of an inside to which no outside and an outside to which no inside corresponds, an opposition unknown to ancient peoples. (History
24)
The quantity of unchecked information and the fact that it finds no immediate application has a twofold effect on modern man (and especially on the German): it creates a disjunction between inside and outside, between content and form, whereby form is rejected as convention, disguise, and dissimulation; 20 and it creates "Innerlichkeit," inwardness. When Nietzsche subsequently mocks the Germans as "the people famed for inwardness" ("das berühmte Volk der Innerlichkeit"), he, in fact, mocks leading codes of Enlightenment ideology, its valuation of inwardness over the social exterior and the body, of content over form, and of rationality and sensibility over rhetoric and conversational aptitude.
Nietzsche specifies the problem causing and caused by inwardness in sections four and five of the treatise. Focusing on modern modes of knowledge acquisition and distribution, he argues that modernity did not create a culture, but only a kind of knowledge of culture. 21 The unchecked and scientifically intensified acquisition of knowledge has led men to fill and overfill themselves with "alien ages, customs, arts, philosophies, religions and knowledge" that turned them into "walking encyclopedias." Such education, according to Nietzsche, does not lead to culturation. In other words, the acquisition of knowledge does not necessarily result in an increased degree of civility, as Enlightenment ideology proclaims. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case: rationality and sensibility do not prevent barbarism. On the contrary, the disjunction between inside and outside that rationality and sensibility create threaten to make modern man more barbaric:
und so ist die ganze moderne Bildung wesentlich innerlich: auswendig hat der The mind-numbing effects of overabundant information threaten, according to Nietzsche, the very civility of a society that prides itself on the study of civilization. In a stunningly modern analysis, Nietzsche focuses on the "medium" as responsible for the absence of culture. The overabundance of information leads modern man to categorize and cast away knowledge rather than actualize it and relate it to "life." In section four of the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche identifies the educational system as the primary culprit; he later adds the mass media of his day, the press, as the second, defining medium of modern knowledge distribution and information processing that is responsible for society's cultural disintegration. In a nutshell, Nietzsche argues that the moment culture becomes "interesting" (i.e., the moment culture becomes an object of historical study), 22 it loses its social function, its ability to provide a form of expression that would give modern man a sense of purpose, meaning, and an empowering will. The media's instant representations of current events, turn modern man into a spectator, an abstraction, and a shadow:
[ [Modern man] who continuously has the feast of a world exhibition prepared for him by his historical artists; he has become a spectator merely enjoying himself and strolling around and brought to a condition which can hardly be altered for a moment even by great wars and great revolutions. The war is not yet over and already it has been transformed a hundred thousandfold into printed paper, already it is being served up as a new stimulant for the wary palates of those greedy for history. It appears almost impossible to elicit a strong full sound even with the mightiest sweep of the strings: it fades away immediately, and in the next moment it already echoes away strengthless in historically subdued vapors.
(History 28-9)
Nietzsche draws on the neurological discourse of his time, describing the deadening effects of overstimulation. 23 As a cultural phenomenon, however, the neurological system under investigation is the modern system of mass communication itself (seen as an extension of our individual nerve system, if we were to follow McLuhan). Nietzsche lays out how modern media culture with its emphasis on news and information --science, too, wants "news"--temporalizes meaning in a way that robs it of its ability to function culturally, that is, to provide purpose, meaning and a will to an integrated society. In more contemporary terms we can say that
Nietzsche recognizes science and the mass media as information processing systems. For such systems, information --which I want to define here, following Gregory Bateson, as a "difference which makes a difference" 24 --is merely of singular and temporary significance. As soon as it is used, it loses its informational value. The differences created by the processing of information are momentary and cannot be repeated. Subsequently, they do not achieve the kind of permanence needed for them to acquire cultural significance. Modern information processing systems compensate for the chronic loss of information by sustaining a constant flow of information, creating and replacing information with ever new differences that again will leave behind little more than another momentary difference within the system of communication. medially. In the process, cultural customs, habits, styles, even beliefs will be treated as "news,"
i.e. will be temporalized and thus loose the ability to have a lasting and unifying effect. In this sense, cultural studies, despite its often contrary political intentions, always runs the risk of furthering rather than opposing the globalizing tendencies of the West and its non-culture.
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III
The loss of meaning described by Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century has, I
believe, only multiplied in today's much more incessant media culture with its ever faster paced and multi-facetted electronic media. Nietzsche's point, however, is not only that the modern modes of information processing by the media make current events lose their cultural significance, but that the teaching of history in itself has a similar effect: it replaces cultural practice with the knowledge of culture(s) and thus reveals cultural practices as contingent. While comparison arguably creates awareness of one's own cultural identity in the first place, it also offers a possible alternative to the cultural choices of any particular group. Once one sees other cultures acting (valuing, perceiving) differently, the necessity of acting in one way rather than another loses its immediacy. In other words, exposing cultural differences introduces the knowledge of the contingency of cultural habits. Baecker argues that the concept of culture was more successful than any other in positing the contingency of all formerly unquestioned pursuits of society while at the same time offering values intended to hide this achievement.
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I contend (with and beyond Baecker) that the concept of culture does not only hide the sense of contingency it creates by attaching value to cultural characteristics (for example, by calling them "achievements"), but that it also functions as an ordering device in a globalizing and increasingly complex world. Since the eighteenth century, the term culture has allowed Western society to categorize and process the plethora of different beliefs, values, and perceptions that it has encountered through political expansion, migration patterns, historical and anthropological studies, ethnographic writing, news reporting, and that are sustained by the incessant information flow of the mass-media. In other words, marking and marketing cultural differences and different cultures allows Western society to accept conflicting outlooks and practices where dogmatic assertions of what is right or wrong, good or bad, natural or unnatural are no longer presupposed or can no longer be enforced. In this regard, the concept culture can be said to be a pharmakon 28 of sorts. It is both, poison and medication for a society that sees itself at odds with its own cultural identity. It is poisonous because it enhances the perception of cultural differences that appear to threaten cultural coherence. At the same time it provides a form of medication for the very problem it creates by offering a common frame of reference which allows Western society to put into perspective the excess of cultural differences it confronts.
IV
Let me return to Nietzsche and take a second, more critical look at his conception of culture. Nietzsche sees, of course, no redeeming function in the modern concept of culture for modern culture. His claim that modernity lacks culture altogether is coupled with the hope for the advent of a new culture that presumably would be able to integrate the individual again. This hope for a new culture emerging, however, raises the question how a highly developed society could get rid of its (however deficient) culture and acquire a new one in the first place. We find the answer to this question in a historical model that motivates and structures much of Nietzsche's philosophy. This historical model is by no means linear, teleological, or even progressive. Rather, it reflects one of the most striking features of Nietzsche's thought, the idea that the application of a concept to itself will be detrimental to this concept. In his recent essay on Nietzsche's relationship to the Enlightenment, David Wellbery identifies the paradox of iterative self-application or recursion as a governing principle of Nietzsche's thought. 29 Paradoxes of self-application can be found on different levels of Nietzsche's writing. The second Untimely Meditation, for example, is caught on the macro level in such a paradox: Nietzsche has to educate his reader historically to dismiss historical education. Nietzsche is well aware of the paradoxical thrust of his philosophical endeavor. 30 The apparent paradox of pursuing history to demolish history should not be misunderstood as an incoherence of Nietzsche's philosophy but rather as a deliberate strategy. This strategy allows Nietzsche to develop a historical model that drives his thought from the Birth of Tragedy and its dramatization of the "present," to Zarathustra's conception of the overman, to the Genealogy's reflection on overcoming nihilism, to the late project of a reevaluation of all values. Nietzsche uses the paradox of self-application to project a historical model that is no longer progressive in the teleological sense, but rather revolutionary, set up for historical "catastrophes," for a sudden and potentially violent turnover from one cultural state to another. In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche uses the verb "umschlagen"
(which means 'to turn into its opposite' and 'to turn over a page' but also retains a sense of 'knocking over') twice to describe the historical effects of recursion. At the end of section fifteen of the Birth of Tragedy (where the original version had ended), this thought figure marks two moments of historical "catastrophe." The first reference is to the effects of Socrates on Greek society where the desire for insatiable and optimistic knowledge "turned" into tragic resignation and destitute need for art. The second reference is to the present. Following the prediction of the famous snake metaphor ("When they see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail --suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy" [Basic the origin of historical education --and its inner quite radical contradiction with the spirit of a "new age", a "modern consciousness"--this origin must itself in turn be historically understood, history must itself dissolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself --this threefold must is the imperative of the spirit of the "new age" if it really does contain something new, mighty, original and a promise of life. (History 45) The idea that by turning the modern, scientific paradigm against itself, this paradigm will selfdestruct and something new, different, and more authentic will be created in its place, allows
Nietzsche to direct his philosophy toward the future, anticipating the possible collapse of the current social order in the hope for the creation of a newly unified and unifying culture.
Nietzsche's belief in a historical turnaround (Umschlag) is based on the assumption that a degree of transparency achieved through self-reflexivity must be detrimental for any particular cultural practice. In this regard, Nietzsche's famous dictum from the second Untimely Meditation that "knowledge kills action" should perhaps be read as specifying: "reflexive knowledge kills cultural action." From today's perspective, or at least from the socio-historical perspective that I sketched above, however, Nietzsche's hope for an act of historical self-effacement appears to underestimate modern society's ability to accommodate (without disintegrating) a high degree of self-reflexivity, including the reflexivity of Nietzsche's own thought. While Nietzsche constantly reflects on the position and impact of his thought on the conceptual history he analyzes, he fails to understand the very reflexivity that he performs as an integral part, not as the demise of, modern society. As I indicated above, high reflexivity is the mark of a functionally differentiated society where each social subsystem defines and negotiates its function reflexively and where subsequently no single social subsystem can speak for or unify all social domains. We have seen that for Nietzsche such institutional autonomy is seen as threatening, as a cause for social disintegration for example, when he understands history being taught or researched merely for the sake of history as detrimental for life. Instead of recognizing the reflexivity of our modern society as an integral part of this society, Nietzsche envisions the return of a "unifying" culture that would subject all social subsystems once again to the hierarchies of an overarching, and presumably mono-contextual worldview.
Nietzsche's failure to understand recursive reflexivity as an integral part of modern culture (rather than as a sign of its immanent end), I believe, is due to the lack of an appropriate social model that would allow him to distinguish modern from pre-modern societies. This lack affects his assessment of the late nineteenth-century cultural state. Instead of searching for a modern definition of culture, Nietzsche transposes an archaic ideal of culture (modeled after the stratified society of ancient Greece) onto modern society. Consequently, he must conclude that modernity lacks culture --rather than that it redefines culture as perspective. The archaic notion of culture employed by Nietzsche can be seen, I believe, as a constitutive blind-spot of his philosophy: constitutive, because on the one hand it provides him with the outside perspective necessary to be the astute observer of modernity that we witnessed above; on the other hand, it leads him to demand the return to a more "authentic" culture which cannot be harmonized with the complexity and reflexivity of modern society, a circumstance that Nietzsche indirectly acknowledges when he hopes for the self-effacement of reflexivity through reflexivity. In his later writings, Nietzsche increasingly draws on biological and evolutionary discourses to motivate his hope for a future return of a unified culture. That is, he develops a kind of cultural
idealism that is open to the political and social abuse it encountered in the first half of the twentieth century.
The advantages and disadvantages of Nietzsche's archaic concept of culture are most apparent in the Genealogy of Morals. Especially the first essay, "'Good and Evil,' 'Good and
Bad'" provides an excellent example of the dynamic that motivates stratified social models where social change is affected from top down and from the bottom up. Values, morals, and truths are linked to social struggles that build and rebuild hierarchical structures. Within such societies, domination and subjection imply and invert each other in a seemingly eternal interpretive struggle that is defined by and defines the powerful and the powerless. As appealing and powerful as Nietzsche's description of a chain of incessant re-interpretations might be for assessing the dynamics of pre-modern societies, the argument gets more complicated and, I
contend, falters when it comes to explaining the transition from pre-modern to modern society. The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, the power over oneself and over fate, has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct. What will he call his dominating instinct? The answer is beyond doubt:
this sovereign man calls it his conscience. (Basic Writings 496)
The creation of conscience is, in turn, linked to the creation of a cultural memory. At this point in the argument, Nietzsche returns once again to the German feature of "inwardness." Linking the creation of memory and modern man's "inwardness" to the extended infliction of physical pain on the human body, Nietzsche suggests a dazzling theory of modern culturation:
Wir Deutschen betrachten uns gewiss nicht als ein besonders grausames und hartherziges Volk, noch weniger als besonders leichtfertig und in-den-Taghineinleberisch; aber man sehe nur unsre alten Strafordnungen an, um dahinter zu kommen, was es auf Erden für Mühe hat, ein "Volk von Denkern" heranzuzüchten (will sagen: das Volk Europa's, unter dem auch heute noch das We Germans certainly do not regard ourselves as a particularly cruel and hardhearted people, still less as a particularly frivolous one, living only for the day; but one has only to look at our former codes of punishments to understand what effort it costs on this earth to breed a "nation of thinkers" (which is to say, the nation in Europe in which one still finds today the maximum of trust, seriousness, lack of taste, and matter-of-factness [. (such as the law, the health system, and also education).
Although it can still be found in certain psychoanalytically oriented readings, 31 the link between physical pain and culturation must seem suspect to the modern observer. It is, in fact, reminiscent of outdated pedagogical dogmas that rely on corporal punishment to force students, or worse, children to memorize. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's link between the creation of the modern soul and the creation of "memory" anticipates more contemporary, sociological accounts of the creation of modern man's "inwardness." The creation of memory, however, is no longer seen as having resulted from the public infliction of physical pain. As recent studies in mediology and systems theory have argued, modern "inwardness" as it evolves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be explained in terms of the invention of the printing press, the increased alphabetization of Europe, and the increased availability of books. It is through the popularization of reading and writing that Europe ascertained its newly defined mnemonic capacities, the basis for the development of its modern sensitivities.
32
In questioning Nietzsche's account of the emergence of modern man, I do not mean to dispute his more general claim that locates coerciveness and violence at the base of a society that insists on being built on principles of reason, openness, sensibility and justice. Nor do I dispute the devaluating effects Nietzsche observes with regard to our information based society. What should be rejected, however, is Nietzsche's precarious dream of a return to a newly unified and unifying culture that would remedy this situation. Such a return is indeed only possible through a violent upheaval of the structure of modern society. The totalitarian attempts of the twentieth century to reintroduce social stratification have, fortunately, failed. Today one might be tempted to view religious fundamentalism as a desperate attempt to escape the disintegrating effects of an information processing world society. Instead of defending a fundamentalist (or socialist) opposition to this society, I suggest we modify Nietzsche's proclaimed desire for a "unified artistic style in all of the life expressions of a people" to fit our modern day reality and call for Resulting, of course, not only from historical studies, but also from our own mobility, modern immigration patterns, and the world wide media coverage which make us confront multiple cultures and cultural differences on a daily basis (see, for example, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Heimat Babylon).
4
Although Eagleton in The Idea of Culture argues from a leftist political position and Rorty (in "Rationality and Cultural Difference") takes the pragmatism of Dewey as his starting point, both speak against the 'romanticizing' of popular and more primitive cultures which characterizes our modern, multi-cultural society. In Germany, the debates on "Multikulturalität" have much more staying power than, for example, the recent controversy over "Leitkultur" has had (seemingly an attempt to return to the nineteenth-century idea of Kultur) which disappeared as soon as it had spent its political capital.
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The historical debates on what it means to be modern are first instances of cultural self-reflection. The first two explicit reflections on modernity date back to 1688, when Charles Perrault published the "Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes en ce qui regarde les Arts et les Sciences" (Paris 1688-1697), and to 1795 when Friedrich Schlegel's "Über das Studium der Griechischen Poesie" with its extensive reflections on modernity were published (see Carsten Zelle, "'Nous, qui sommes si modernes, serons anciens dans quelques siècles'. Zu den Zeitkonzeptionen in den Epochenwenden der Moderne").
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I will return to the social implications of this definition of culture below, with regard to Dirk Baecker's argument. Baecker traces the modern concept of culture back to the eighteenth century and interprets it as a pan-national, "Western" phenomenon. 14 Robert McGinn shows that Nietzsche develops the second function of culture --social integration of the individual --already in the later parts of the Birth of Tragedy (following section 15): "Greek tragedy was both a prophylactic against the debilitating effects of unmediated encounter with the horror and terror of human existence, as well as a vehicle of transcendence vis-à-vis the alienating effects of complete socialization into the secular life-and thoughtforms of the phenomenal world" (Robert McGinn, "Culture as Prophylactic," 101). The Untimely Meditations hardly mention the horror vacui (horror of nothingness) problem anymore, but rather focus on the social disintegration of the modern individual. 15 The following considerations rely primarily on the works of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. The idea of functional differentiation, however, dates back to the works of Emile Durkheim and Talcott Pasons. These social changes are also addressed, albeit in less structural terms, by the works of Norbert Elias. In his seminal work Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und Psychogenetische Untersuchungen, (The Civilization Process. The History of Manners), Elias, who on numerous occasion credits Nietzsche for his insights on the social circumstances which helped define our modern psychological sensibilities, links the process of Western civilization to the increased control of affects forced upon the individual through the ever increasing differentiation of social functions: "From the earliest times of Occidental history to our present, societal functions have differentiated themselves more and more under the pressure of competition. The more they are differentiated, the greater becomes the number of functions and thus of people on whom the individual depends, in all of his activities, from the most simple and everyday activities to the most complicated and rare, […] The individual is forced to regulate his behavior in an ever more differentiated, uniform and stable manner" ("Von den frühesten Zeiten der abendländischen Geschichte bis zur Gegenwart differenzieren sich die gesellschaftlichen Funktionen unter einem starken Konkurrenzdruck mehr und mehr. Je mehr sie sich differenzieren, desto größer wird die Zahl der Funktionen und damit der Menschen, von denen der Einzelne bei allen seinen Verrichtungen, bei den simpelsten und alltäglichsten ebenso, wie bei den komplizierten und selteneren, beständig abhängt. [...] Der Einzelne wird gezwungen, sein Verhalten immer differenzierter, immer gleichmäßiger und stabiler zu regulieren. ; translation mine]). 16 To understand "reflexivity" as the mark of modernity is neither new nor does it need the conceptual framework of systems theory to defend this view. Christoph Menke, for example, looking at romantic irony, argues in his essay on Aesthetic Subjectivity that "the central destination of modernity should be considered to be not subjectivity, but reflexivity. The type of reflection that is designated here looks behind the world of forms at the means of their formation and creation" ("Die zentrale Bestimmung der Moderne sollte nicht in Subjektivität, sondern in Reflexivität gesehen werden. Der damit bezeichnete Typ der Reflexion geht hinter die Welt der Formen zurück zu dem, wodurch sie geformt oder hervorgebracht werden" [Christoph Menke, "Ästhetische Subjektivität," 609; translation mine]).
17 According to Luhmann's essay Individual, Individuality, Individualism, this led society "to think, treat, and institutionalize individuals more individually, while in reality it was about shifting individuality from [social] inclusion to exclusion" ("Individuen individueller zu denken, zu behandeln, zu institutionalisieren, während es in Wirklichkeit darum ging, Individualität von Inklusion auf Exklusion umzustellen" [Niklas Luhmann, "Individuum, Individualität, Individualismus," 165; translation mine]). Art and literature soon become the repositories for the eccentric individual to include its eccentricity socially. A new emphasis on authenticity and immediacy characterize this attempt to think individuality more individually and to integrate socially social eccentricity. The Enlightenment emphasis on rationality and sensibility did not only increase the interior space of the individual --create what Foucault calls the modern "soul" --it also increased the sensibility for dissimulation and convention, for the separation of inside and outside, and for the incongruities between intentions and communications (see also Albrecht Koschorke's book Körperströme und Schriftverkehr: Mediologie des 18. Jahrhunderts [the title of this book translates: Bodily Fluids and Literary Intercourse: Mediology in the 18 th Century], which links the increased sensibility and the individualization of modern man to the change from oral to literal communications). Paradoxically then, if Nietzsche propagates a culture which overcomes the social disintegration of the individual, he acts to overcome social effects which made this individual possible in the first place. 18 Once we define society comprehensively, as the system of communication, that is as the sum total of possible communications, defining oneself outside of, or, in opposition to society becomes a paradoxical endeavor: the moment it is communicated (even through one's silence on the matter), it will be part of society (society defined as the sum total of its communications) again and hence unable to escape social definition. Nevertheless, the creation and explorations of such "outsides" particularly in and through literature has been central to modern society. They are based on the eighteenth century tradition which defines society either in opposition to the natural and individual world or as the sum total of its institutions.
"Weltgeist" are modern day myths, and proclaims: "heute wollen wir vielmehr einmal unserer Unweisheit von Herzen froh werden und uns als den Thätigen und Fortschreitenden, als den Verehrer des Prozesses, einen guten Tag machen. Mag unsere Schätzung des Historischen nur ein occidentalisches Vorurtheil sein; wenn wir nur wenigstens innerhalb dieser Vorurtheile fortschreiten und nicht stillstehen!" (KSA I:256) [today we want rather to rejoice in our unwisdom from the bottom of our hearts and as active and progressive men, as admirers of the process, enjoying ourselves. May our estimation of the historical be but an occidental prejudice; as long as, within these prejudices, we make progress and do not stand still. (History 13-14) ]. 31 See, for example, Judith Butler's work, including her recent contribution to the debate on the contemporary relevance of Nietzsche, the article "Dramatic Personae,". 32 See, for example, Niklas Luhmann who understands the change in historical semantics that marks modernity as resulting from increased literacy rates. The subsequent change from conversation to writing as primary medium of communication accompanied the transition from a predominantly aristocratic (stratified) to an increasingly functionally differentiated society. Building on this argument, see again Koschorke who (also drawing on the works of Norbert Elias) elaborates the historical changes that define the modern soul along the lines of a restructuring of the semiotics of the body, changes in personal hygiene and definitions of interpersonal space, and the increase in communicative distance, etc. as signal traits of a society whose primary communicational medium is writing rather than conversation. 33 I propose a constructivistic point of view on understanding minority and majority cultures, as inventing and creating themselves rather than (following eighteenth-century literary ideas) as merely "expressing" preexisting cultural realities. In this respect, I follow the pragmatist stance of Richard Rorty: "To be a pragmatist rather than a realist in one's description of the acquisition of full personhood requires thinking of its acquisition by blacks, gays, and women in the same terms as we think of its acquisition by Galilean scientists and Romantic poets. We say that the latter groups invented new moral identities for themselves by getting semantic authority over themselves. As time went by, they succeeded in having the language they had developed become part of the language everybody spoke. Similarly, we have to think of gays, blacks, and women inventing themselves rather than discovering themselves, and thus of the larger society as coming to terms with something new" (Richard Rorty, "Rationality and Cultural Difference," 225).
34 Ironic according to Richard Rorty's definition (see esp. Richard Rorty, Irony, Contingency, Solidarity, .
